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ABSTRACT
Thispaperanalyzes some aspectsoftileeffectsof traderestric-
tions(such as tariffs,quotasand quality controls) andtheirdesira-
bilitywhen the quantity of the imported good is endogenous, and the
foreign producer is a monopolist. It uses a fairly general model
based on the work of Spence and Sheshinski.
A crucial determinant of the direction of these effects is shown
to be the valuation of increments in quality bymarginal consumers,
relativeto that of all consumers on average. A way of comparing in-
finitesimal equivalent policies is developed and used tocompare import
equivalent policies. For reasonable characterizations of demand —
tariffsare shown to dominate quotas on the basis of their revenue ef-
fects alone, while quotas are shown to dominate tariffs on the basis
of their quality effects alone. Also, quality controls are shown to
dominate both tariffs and quotas on the basis of revenue effects alone
for reasonable characterizations of demand. Some specialcases are
also analyzed, including the case where demand is modelledalong the
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Introduction
This paperanalyzessome aspects of the effects of trade restric-
tionsand their desirability when the quality of the importedgood(s) is
endogenous, and the foreign producer has market power.
Typically, a firmmustdecide on the rnmiber of products produced
and their qualities. By introducingmany qualities a producer could
target products to groups of consumers and make greater profits bydoing
so. However, there are likely to be significant costs associated with
producingmany qualities,1 and to this extent the producer would want
to produce one product targeted to all consumers.
This discussion suggests two aspects of a producer's choice ofpoten-
tial interest. The first relates to how the producer when faced with
diverse consumers chooses one good which is best suited to thegroup as
a whole, and how this aspect of his choice is affected by trade restric—
tions. The second relates to the pricing of a product line ——andthe
effects of trade restrictions on such pricing policies. I will deal
with the first in this paper. The second is dealt with ina companion
paper. (See Krishna 0984).)
Existing work in the trade literature on the effects of trade restric-
tions with endogenous quality focuses mainly on the nature of these effects
in a competitive world. The specifications of the models are therefore
particularlysuited to the perfectly competitive paradigm. Unfortunately,
they also tend to obscure some significant aspects of firm behavior in
an imperfectly competitive world.—2—
Previous srk by IDdriguez (1980) and Santoni and Van Cott(1980),
for example, deals with these questions in the context of a specific
model (associated with Swan (1970)), where demand is for services of the
good only, and higher quality goods are more durable.This specifica-
tion simplifies the analysis considerably. As only the quantity of ser-
vices matters to the constmier, questions regarding the composition of
the product line, or those regarding targeting products to groups of
consters do not arIse at all! ly one quality is produced ——that
which minimizes the unit cost of producing services when the optimal
level of services is beingproduced.In their model, quotas cause
quality upgrading, while ad—valorem tariffs do not. Althoughthis
accords well with empirical work (see Turner(1983),Feenstra (1982)),
their reason Is related to cost rather than demand conditions. An
alternative reason, based on demand conditions,emerges from my analy—
us. This reason is related to quality being chosen sothat it is best
suited to all consumers who are served.
Hence, it seemsfairto argue that while the effects of trade restric-
tions withendogenous quality have been studied, the issues are far from
wellunderstood, especially in the context of imperfectly competitive
markets.
An advantage of the Swan model is that the comparisonof various
policies can be made with theaid of a two—dimensional diagram. This
is not possible in a more general model. Hence, the techniquesused
in this paper cannot be only diagramatic. In this paper) I develop a
simple way to compare various infinitesimal policies.These comparisons
are illustrated using diagrams whenever possible.—3—
Inthe first part of this paper, I consider the effect of trade
restrictions when the market structure is that of foreign monopoly, and
only one quality is produced ——sothat the productmust be targeted to
allconsumers. Quality is modeled in a general way as a factor that
ratsesthe willingness to pay for a unit ——asin Spence (1976) and
Sheshinski (1976). In contrast to the results obtained using the Swan
specification (which is a special case of this specification), quotas
do not necessarily raise qualities and tariffs do not leave the quality
of imports unaffected. The effect on quality of a quantitative restric-
tion is shown to depend on the valuation of quality increments by the
marginal consumer as compared to the average valuation of quality incre-
ments by all consumers. If the marginal valuation of a quality incre-
ment exceeds the average, quality downgrading occurs as the result of
thequota.If the reverse is true, quality is upgraded in response to
the quota. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. A bind-
ing quota removes the marginal consumer from the market. If this consumer
valued quality less (more) than the average consumer, the benefit to the
monopolist of raising quality exceeds (falls short of) the cost of raising
qualityand it is in the monopolist's interest to raise (lower) quality.
Similarly, the effect of a minimum quality level is to raise
(lower) output, if the valuation of an increment in quality by the
marginal conser exceeds (falls short of) that of the average.
An ad—valorem tariff affects the monopolist's decision on both out-
put and quality and this couplicates the result. If the valuation of an
increment in quality by the marginal conser is more than the average,
quality is downgraded, but the reverse is no longer true.-.4-.
Inthe second section the effect on welfare of any restriction is
decomposed into its components namely that via output, quality, and revenue.
Irrespective of whether quotas raise or lower quality their welfare effects
via quality alone are shown to be beneficial. When import equivalent
policies are compared, the ranking of policies is shown to depend on
whether quotas raise or lower quality and on whether tariffs lower the
volume of imports or not. In the "normal" case, when quotas raise quality
and tariffs lower imports, tariffs dominate quotas on the basis of their
quality effects alone, while quotas dominate tariffs on the basis of their
revenue effects alone. It is also shown that quality controls dominate
both tariffs and quotas on the basis of quality effects alone, as long as
atariff reduces imports.
Other definitions of equivalence —suchas revenue equivalence or
expenditureequivalence can alsobe dealtwith in my framework, and they
leadto similar results.Their analysis is omitted in the interests of
brevity.Section 1
TheEffectsof Trade iestrictions
Theanalysis In this paper is confined to a partial equi1ibrim
setting. There Is one foreign producer of the product, who acts as a
monopolist. The produceris assumedtoset aprice, anda -
qualitylevel (or equivalently, an output and quality level) whichthe
consumertakes as given. c.iality Is modelled as a uni—dimensional
variable,q •Inorder to focus on the role of demand conditions in
thispaper, I assume that there is a constant marginal cost, C(q) ,of
roducinga unit of output of quality q •xis total demand. The
inverse demand function facing the producer Is given by P(x,q)
Pq(x,q) Is assumed positive. c.iality is thus modelled in a general
way, as a factor that increases the willingness to pay for any given
output level.2
The monopolist's choice of x and q will be given by the solution
to the profit maximizing problem:
(1.1) Maxfl(x,q)(P(x,q) —C(q))x
x,q
Assume that a unique interior solution exists to this problem.







The second order conditions for a maximum are given by the Hessian
H" beingnegativedefinite at (x*q*),thesolutions to (1.2)(1.3),
where,"H" at *,q*)is given by:
r(2P +xP ) (Px)
(1.4)"H" x xx xq i— 11 12
L(Pxq {qq Cqq)7}JLn21H22
The effect,on quality, of a quantitative restriction may be
examined by reformulatingthe problem set up in (1.1) as a maximization
problem subject to the constraint that x ( .Simplecomparative
statics on q with respect to ,evaluatedat —x*,wouldindi-
catethe effect of a "slightlyrestrictive" quota. This procedure gives
the result that:
—P
(1.5) — xg —(p—c) dx qq qq
x—x*
This may beeasily interpreted with reference to Diagram 1.1.
Equation (1.2) gives the level of x that maximizesprofits for each
given q •Thelocus of such pointsistraced out by x(q) in Diagram
1.1.Similarly, equation (1.3) traces out the levelof q that maxi-
mizesprofits for each given level of x .q(x)is the locus of such
points. x*,q*are given by the Intersection of x(q) and q(x)
Notice thatas H11H22 ,elements of the Hessian "H', are negative,
the sign of the slopes of x(q) and q(x) at x*,q* arethe same as
the sign of xq .Inaddition, as H > 0 ,x(q) Issteeperthan
q(x). The restriction on x essentially suspends equation(1.2),—7—
replacing It by the veTtical line ,x.Loweringifromx thus
moves the equilibriuminthe direction of the arrows in Diagrams l.1(a)
and(b). Thisraises quality if < 0andlowersit if xq >
If Pq is monotonic in x then 0 as fPq(V)dV
—
0•Thisis because of the usual relation betweenmarginals
lx
andaverages.-fP(v,q)dv is the average valuation of an increment of
q
quality,while Pq() is the valuation of an increment in quality by
the marginal consumer. The following interpretation of P (as given
by Spence) is illuminating in this context. In Spence's words:
"xq is the change in Pq as one moves dow-n the slectruni of
consumers ordered by their willignness to pay.If P< 0
the marginal value of quality falls as absolute willingness to
pay falls. en this is true, the average value attached to
quality exceeds the marginal consumers valuation."3
Lowering output removes the marginal consumer from the market.
If the marginal consumer values quality less than the average value
attached to quality, it is in the interest of the monopolist to
raise (lower) quality, as shown by equation (l.5).
The effects of minimumqualitystandards maybeanalyzed in an
identical fashion. The comparative statics calculations show that:
—Px
dx xq
(1.6) (2P +xP) H X XX
Thisexpression has the samesignas xq .If1xq < 0 ,asrises,
x falls. This result maybeinterpreted as follows. The increase in
kes servingthe marginal consumer less profitable ashedoes not—8—
value increments in q as highly as the average, andsooutput falls
with increases in q
Unlike the effects of a quota andquality control,whichineffect
suspended one equation, an ad—valorem tariff affects the position of
both x(q) and q(x) .Theproblem facing the producer is
(1.7) Max(P(x,q)(l—t)—C(q))x
x,q
Simple comparative statics yield:
(1.8) dx (Px+ P)(P —C)x —Px P x
x qg qq xqg
fRI
Secondorder conditions ensure that if P> 0 , <0 .IfP< 0
xq dt xq
the sign of is indeterminate.
Similarly,
(1.9) dq(2P + P x)xP —(Px + P)xP
x xx q x xq
Again, > 0 < 0and if xq < 0,thesignof is
ambiguous.Diagrams 1.2(a) and (b) illustrate the effect of an increase
in t •'E"is the free trade equilibrium. A" is the equilibrii.nii
with a tariff. It is obvious from the diagram that at least one of
and mustbe negativeif P< 0. dt xq
The effects of a specific tariff are qualitatively the same as
those of a quota.The specific tariff, a ,hasproducers maximizing
profits given by:—9—
(1.10) fl(xq,s)—(P(xq)—C(q)—s)x
Doing the required comparative statics yields:





so a specific tariff always lowers output. It raises quality if
while lowering it if P >0.
xq
Raving derived the effects of different kinds of restrictions on
the quality and output choices of a monopolist, it is appropriate to
relate the results In this section to previous work in the area.
Trade theorists, in discussing the effect of trade restrictions
on quality, have focused attention on models of perfect competition,
and on the demand characterization associated with Swan (1970). The
assmiption in such dels is that demand is essentially for services
produced by the goods, and higher quality goods have greater durability
and hence produce more services. As a result, the questions regarding
product lines and choice of characteristi's do not arise at all. ly
the quality that minimizes cost per—unit of services will be produced.
Quality choice is completely determined by cost conditions. This
characterization is somewhat unappealing as it asst.es that the quality
dimension cannot be used by the monopolist in his interests.
An ad—'alor tariff does not affect this choice of quality, but a
quota does in the Swan model. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. The quota,— 10—
whenbinding, can be thought of as having a shadow price associated with
it. The effect of raising q on cost per unit of a aervice is, to the
first order, equal to zero, as cost per unit of a service is ainimized.
However, an increase in q lowers the shadow price of the constraint,
asitmakestheconstraint less binding. Thus, on the margin, raising
q in response to a quota is profitable. Tariffs do not raise quality as
the cost minimization problem is unaffected by a tariff.5
There are two advantages to using a re general framework.
First, it shows that the monopolist, with two characteristics to set
so as to maximize profits, will use both to extract as much surplus
fr constmers as possible. Any restriction changes the optimal mix
'between the use of the two, and how this mixchangesdepends on demand
characteristics as shown earlier.
The second advantage of the approach is its generality. The
approach of Rodriguez (1979) and Santoni and Van Cott (1980) emerges
as a special case. Though they only consider the case of competition,
it is easy to extend omè of their results to the monopoly case, as is
done later.
The results of this section are crucial to the analysis of the next
section. In the next section, tariffs, quotas and quality controls




This section compares ad—valorem tariffs, quotas, and quality
controls that achieve a given slight reduction of imports. A few pre—
14m 4 ,i n rz C 4 v K .• 1. 1 4 I. .rc.
Iwill assume that any desired quality level can be ensured. It is
assumed that the administrative machinery can set both minimum and
rnaximum quality standards. In the same spirit, tariffs are zxt confined
to being positive. It is possible for a tariff to raise imports, and
decreases in physical imports may require subsidies.
2.2 The Sale of Licenses:
In order to be able to compare tariffs and quotas, it is necessary
to specify howimportlicenses are distributed, whoappropriatesthe
rents, and what these rents are. This is easy in the case of corn—
petition,where the difference between domesticprice(as determined by
market supply with the quota and market demand), and the foreign price,
determines the level of rents. This difference is the price of a
license auctioned to competitive suppliers.
In the case of foreign inopo1y, no foreign supply curve exists,
with or without any restrictions present. It is notobvioushow much
wouldb paid for a license, and what ensures that a license is used.
Theproblem isthatofspecifying howthesale of license affects the— 12-
profitmaximization problem perceived by the monopolist. e inter-
pretation of the specification that follows is that the goverxent sets
a price for a license which is sold to foreign producerswhotakethis
price as given and beyond their control. A licenseallows the foreign
producer to export one unit of a good of any quality itdesires. Thus,
a license acts exactly like a specific tariff. If the government
wishes to set a quota at the level R ,Ituld implement it by setting
the license price such that the foreign monopolist chooses to sell
only R
Thisisportrayed in DIagram2.1(a) and (b). DIagram2.1(a)
shows the optimal choice of x for a given q and2.1(b) depicts
the optimal choice of q for a given x •Theformer is characterized
by the familiar marginal cost equals marginal revenuecondition. The
latter is characterized by the inverse demand function beingtangentto
the cost function. These are implications of the first orderconditions
for a maximum.MR(x,q)is the marginal revenue function corresponding
to the inverse demand function p(x,qf) •xand qf are the profit
maximizing output andqualitychoices for the monopolist underfree
trade.
When imports are restricted to be R ,qRis the profit maximizing
quality choice for the monopolist as shown in Diagram2.1(b). If qR
is thequalitychoice, p(1,qR) Is the inverse demand function facing
themonopolistin Diagram2.1(a),andMR(x,qR) Is the corresponding
marginal revenue curve.Ifa license price ofL is set, the monopo-
list u1d wish to produce R .Thus,the quota at level R canbe- 13-
implementedby setting a license price of pL • Ris the profit maxi-
mizing choice of output on the part of the monopolist, given a license
price of L ,hisbeliefs on how he can affect the price Pt and a
quality level of qR •qRis the profit maximizing quality choice when
output is R
This assption on the beliefs of the foreign monopolist is not
the only possible assumption that could be made. The foreign firm might
believethat it can influence the price of a license, in this case, the
relative strengths of the monopolist and the government would determine
what part of the rents were appropriated by the monopolist. If the
monopolist refused to purchase any licenses and the government wished to
have the quota level actually Imported, the only price it could change
for a license would be zero. All rents would accrue to the foreign
firms under this assumption. There are tworeasonswhy I do not
choose to make this assumption. Firstly, the relative strength of a
government as compared to a firm make the assumption implausible.In
addition, it is often argued that in practice, tariffs generate revenues
but quotas do not as licenses are rarely sold.I compare tariffs and
quotas when the best case for quotas is made. I show that even onthese
terms, revenue effects of a tariff tend to dominate those of a quota.
The assumption that quotas generate no revenues would needlessly bias
the welfare comparisons to follow in favor of tariffs.
Once again, notice that under this assumption on the beliefs of the
monopolist, the revenue from the sale of licenses is identical to the
revenue from a specific tariff, s ,thatlovers import. to the level— 14
ofthe restriction. If fact, all the effects of the quota may be asso—
elated with those of the specific tariff, s, that implements the quota.
2.3 Tariffs vs. iotas:
In order to compare different kinds of restrictions, it is neces—
.ary to specify the national lfarefunction. I will assune that the
dandsidecan be represented by a utility maximizing aggregate con—
stserwho has rightson all profits generated by competitive domestic
producers of a numeraire good. The profits generated by production of
the imported good accrue to foreign nationals. The weight given to
revenue in the welfare function may be less than one if there were con-
siderable administrative costs of collecting the revenue, or if govern-
ment essentially wasted part of revenue raised. Similarly, if the
goverrnent cannot undertake policies in the national interest due to
revenue considerations, this weightmay exceed one. The national welfare
function, when the specific tariff "s" is levied is defined by:
(2.1) W(x,q,s) —{u(x,q)
—P(x,q)x]+asx
"a" is the weight given to revenue raised inthe welfare function,
andis assumed to be non—negative. P(x,q) is the price paid by the
consumer for purchasing a unit of the goodof quality q •sxis the
revenueearned by government from the scheme outlined above, where s
isdetermined so as to cause the monopolist to sell only the desired
level of imports. Both x and q, of course, depend on s as well.
The effect on national welfare of a unit decrease in the level of
imports from the free trade levels, caused by a quota may be decomposed— 15—
intothree parts —theeffect via output, the effect via quality, and
the effect via revenue. Define As as the specific tariff required to
lower imports by one unit. Then the change in ilfare due to a reduc—
tion of imports by one unit is given by:
(.2)
AW—! ! +!!a+
Qa a aqas 3s




As the monopolist maximizes profits, -Px —(P—C).Differentiating
(2.1), and using (1.9), (1.11), and (1.12) and evaluating welfare changes
about s =0allows equation (2.2) to be re—written as:





Q qq qq qq qq
This expression shows that there is always an adverse effect on welfare
via output of a quota. This is expected, as a monopolist produces too
little output for any given quality level, and a quota aggravates this
distortion.
Less expected is the fact that as Pq is assumed to be monotonic
in output, there is always a beneficial effect on welfare via quality
and revenue. Notice that:6
(2.5) U (i,)- P -[45U -P(u)] q q q- 16—
—[4fP(v,)dv —P(u)] q q
If 'xq is positive, the average valuation of quality incrents
wuSt be below Pq ,sothat (2.5) is negative. Similarly, if P Is
negative, (2.5) mustbepositive. As Pqq —
Cqq
< 0 by second order
conditions, the second term in (2.4) is always positive. When xq <
the inopolist is producing too low a quality level (as /q >0),and a
quota raises quality, thus .raising welfare. If P >0,toohigh a
quality level is being produced (W/q< 0), and a quota lowers quality,
which again raises welfare.
The effect on welfare, via revenue, Is always beneficial as
the sale of licenses transfers some of the monopolist's profits to the
national government.
Now consider the effect on welfare of an import equivalent tariff,
•National welfare is given by:
T
(2.6) W —U(x,q)—P(x,q)x+ atP(x,q)x
Differentiating (2.4) gives:
(2 •7) — + +
where (1.8) can be used to define the import equivalent tariff rate,
asbeing:





Using(1.8) and (1.9) allows (2.7) to be written as:
(U —px)[(2P +xP)P —(Px +P)P ]








l(Px+P)(P —C )x—P xPxJ x qq qq xqq
The effect on welfare via output of an import equivalent tariff and
quota are identical. The effect of the tariff on welfare via quality is
beneficial if P1q > 0 ,asthen the tariff lowers quality and, as
quality is at too high a level, this is beneficial. If P< 0
quality is Bet at too low a level, but the tariff maylowerit further,
atd the effect of a tariff on welfare via quality maybeharmful. The
effect via revenue raises welfare if a positive tariff is required to
lower imports, while it lowers welfare if a 8ubsidy is required.
Using (2.9) and (2.4) allows us to compare a quota to the import
equivalent tariff. The resulting expression is somewhat formidable.
(2.10) —wl — [(Uq—
PqX)
{(PqqCqq)
[(2P +xP)P —(Px +P)P x xx q x xg
—C )—P xP) x qq qq xq q
_______ PIHI
-C )T(Px+P)(P-C )-P Px] qq qq x qq qq xqq
The first term in brackets compares quality effects on welfare,
while the second term in brackets compares their revenue effects. The— 18
importanceof revenue raised by the restrictions is given by the size of
a •Ifa —0,thefirst term in brackets will determine the ranking
of a tariff and its import equivalent quota, while if a is large, the
second term will determine this ranking.
Expanding the terms in the first brackets shows thatthe expression
in the first brackets (denoted by (tWQ —WT)
as it is the cocparison
q
between a quota and tariff on the basis of their quality effects alone)
equals:




Consider the sign of this where xq < 0 and < 0so that a quota
leads to quality upgrading and an ad—valorem tariff lowers imports,the
'norinal' case on the basis of casual empiricism. In this case, thenthe
above expression is positive and a comparison of a tariff and quota on
the basis of their effects on welfare via quality alone goes infavor
of quotas.If P1q > 0 (which implies that < 0 )or.
>0
(which implies Pzq < 0), the reverse is true.
The intuition behind this is clear from Diagram 1.2(a)and(b).
Consider first the case where xq <0,portrayedin Diagram 1.2(a). A
quotaand an import equivalent tariff give rise to equilibrium points
such as C and A if.-< 0,andC and A' if --> 0.Asthe monopolist
setsqualitytoolowwhenP <0and as C lies atahigher utility
levelthan A, a quotadominates a tariff in the normal case. If >0,
atariffdominates a quota as A' lies aboveC. Ifxq >(Diagram 1.2(b)),
thena tariffdominates a quota as quality is set too high and C lies above A.— 19—
!xpandingthe termsinthesecondset of brackets in (2.10) gives
therankingof an import equivalent tariff and quota in terms of their








Notice thatin thenormalcase this expression is negative. The
resultsso far are conveniently summarized inProposition 1.—20—
proposition1: Comparisons between tariffs andquotaswhichareimport
equivalent depends on the Importance of revenue raisingin the national
welfare function as given by a ,aswellason the nature of preferences
over output and quality. For the normal"case( 0,P
< 0) •the
choice of policy depends onlyonthe weight assigned by a to revenue
considerations in the national welfare function. If a is very large,
so that revenue considerations are of great importance, atariff always
dominates a quota. If revenues are given a small enough weight inthe
national welfare function, so that a is close to zero, then quotas
always dominate tariffs.
Another special case allows us to focus on the role of P in
xq
this comparison. Noticethatif Pis independent of x ,P and
q xq
U —Px are equal to zero. Hence, there is no effect on welfare,via
q q
quality of either measure. Therefore, all comparison mustbe on the
basis of revenue effects only. The revenue effects of atariff in this
case are preferable to those of the quota as (2.12)reduces to:
(P )x2(2P + xP )
(2.13) WQ — — [p(p+ p)
Second order conditions ensure that 2P —xP< 0 •Thisensure that
x XX
(2.14) is negative, so that the tariff is preferable tothe quota. Thus
we have shown that:
Proposition2: Ifthevaluation ofanincrent inquality,Pqis
independent of output, o xq —0•thenatariff always dominatesan
import equivalent quota.— 21—
2.4Tariffs vs. (iotas: A Special Case:
Next consider the case where demandisfor services of the good
produced. Higher quality is identified with greater durability, and
hence a greater quantity of embodied services. Rodriguez and Santoni
and Van Cott discuss how quotas and tariffs can be ranked in such a
m6del in the presence of conpetition.
The assumption behind this specification is that utility is a func-
tion only of the amount of services provided. Thus, if S —xqis the




is the inverse demand function for the good of quality q .Dividingby
q gives G(xq) —Pi)
,asthe inverse demand function for services.
The monopolist maximizes:
[P(x,q)-C(q)]x -[C(S)-C()j
Thus, q is chosen independently of S, so as to minimizeC(q)
so that quality choice is independent of demandconditions.Notice that
as a consequence an ad—valorem tariff does not affect the choice of q
A quota, however, does affect the choice of q
For notational convenience ,definew to be 2C' + SC. Notice that
w < oasa,r(S,g)< 0 by the second order conditions for a maximum.
as2— 22—
Itis easy to show that for this aodel:
(2.14)
—xqPC dx— q q -
sothat a tariff lowers output,
(2.15) o dt
so that a tariff has no effect on qualitychoice, and
(2.16) —xg >
dsFHI
othat quality is upgraded due to a quota.
We know that the effect via quality onwelfare of a quota is always
beneficial, and in this case, a tariff has noeffect on welfare via
quality. Thus, their comparison in termsof their effects on welfare
via quality is given by:
(2.17) WQ —WTI
- — (—x2C'q) )> 0
q q qq
The revenue effect, however, goes inthe opposite direction. This







The net effect aaybecomputed, when C" —0,and —1to be in23 —
favoroftariffs, as
(2.19) £WQ —WT() [qCqq +C —SC']< 0
qqqq q
Thus, we have shown the following:
Proposition 3:If demand for the good is derived from services produced
by the good and higher quality good produce more services, then if
—0,sothat revenue considerations are unimportant, a quota is pre-
ferable to an import equivalent tariff. If is large, and revenue
considerations are of primary importance, a tariff is preferable to and
import equivalent quota. If both are equally important, and demand for
services is linear, a tariff is preferable to the import equivalent
quota. Notice that this is the opposite of the Rodriguez result
wherea quota was preferable to a tariff.
Thisconcludes the comparison of tariffs and quotas whichare
import equivalent. We turn now to a comparison of each of these poli-
cies with import equivalent quality controls.
2.5 Quality Controls vs. Tariffs and Quotas:
Anycomparisonof a quality control with a tariff or a quota will
be naturally biased in favor of the tariff and quota, as these measures
generate revenue. Therefore, I will only compare them in their
















Notice that quality controls always raise welfare via their effect on











In their effects on welfare via quality alone, qualitystandards
are superior to quotas. The intuition behind thisresult may be
understood by refering to Diagram 1.1. If xq < o, higherwelfare
arises from higher q and higher x ,givenby the shaded region in
Diagram l.la. Similarly if xq > 0 ,higherwelfare arises fron lwer
q and higher x ,givenby the shaded region in Diagram l.lb. A quota
leading to a decrease in output of a unit leads to equilibriumat a
point like A. A quality control that lowers outputby as much, leads
to equilibrium at point B. The welfare at B is always higherthan that
at A.
Next, I compare a tariff and the import equivalent qualitycontrol.
Again, only their effects on welfare via quality arecompared. Note—25—
thatwe already have a result in the case where demand is only for ser—
vices provided. In this case, astariffdo not affect quality choice,
and as the effect on welfare via quality of quality controls is always
beneficial, quality controls dominate tariffs in their effects on
welfare via quality.
The comparison for the general case is made in equation (2.23
(2.23) (WT —Wq)Iq
—[(2? + xP )P —(Px +P)P I(2P+xP)
tTJ—Px
x xx g x xq xxx1
q q
/I[px+P)(p—C)— PxP ) Px x qq qqxqq xq
—(U —Px) R(Px+P) 1rqg1 x 0
i, ,2 x +P)(P—C)— PxP ]
xq x qq qq xq q
as 0 •If-
<0 ,soa tariff reduces output, a quality contilol
is better than an import equivalent tariff. If > 0 ,thena subsidy
is required to reduce output, and a tariff is better than quality
control. Again, the intuition is apparent from Diagraxn 1.2. Consider
first the case where P<0and -< 0,sothat a tariff is required
xq dt
to lower imports. It is easytosee that the tariff shifts both x(q)
and q(x) towards the origin as in Diagram 1.2(a). A and B are achieved
by a tariff and a quality control that are import equivalent. As the
quality chosen by the monopolist is too low, and as B lies directly above
A, the quality control must dominate the tariff in its effect on welfare via
quality alone.Siallarly, if .>0 ,thena subsidywould be required
to lower output, and A' would be the equilibrii under the import
equivalent tariff. A' lies directly above B and thus the tariff would- 26-
dominatethe import equivalent quality control in termsofits effects
on welfare via quality. Similarly, if xq > 0as in Diagram1.2(b),
the quality control dominates the tariff as A (the tariff point) lies
directly above B (the quality control point). As xq > 0the monopo-
list sets quality at too high a level, so that the comparison between A
andBon the basis of quality effects alone goes in favor of the quality
control.
The results of thIs subsectIon may be smarIzed as follows:
Proposition 4: Whenrevenueconsiderations are unimportant (a 0),
thenquality controls dominate Import equivalent quotas. In addition,
Ifimports fall due to an ad—valorein tariff, they dominate import
equivalent tariffs as well.
Quotasarewidelyusedin order to restrict trade. However, the
common feeling is that tariffs are a superior way of restricting trade.
If the quality aspect is supressed in the above framework, it is easy to
see that tariffs dominate quotas Ho.ever,when quality aspects are in-
troduced,a tendency enrges for quotasto dominate tariffs on the basis
oftheir quality effects, andtheir rankingdepends on the importance of
sucheffects,relative to other effects. Inother words, quotas become
moredesirable instn.ments, compared to tariffs, when their effectson
qualityaretaken intoaccount.Similarcomparisons of policies which
are equivalent in terms of revenue or foreign exchange use can be
made with similar results.— 27—
Conclusion
Although the effects of trade restrictions with endogenous quality
have been previously studied the specification of the structures to be
analyzed have been particularly suited to the paradigm of perfect coin—
pçtition.
In an imperfectly competitive world, a large number of questions
arise which do not have corresponding analogues in a competitive world.
In order to study such question, it Is important to develop simple
models to capture, possibly in Isolation, the factors which might be
important in answering such questions. This paper Is to be viewed as an
attempt at doing just this.
The purpose ofthis paperwas to analyze the effects of different
kinds of trade restriction on the quality chosen by a foreign monopolist,
and to examine the relative desirability of alternative policies in
attaining a given non—economic objective. The presumption (based on the
Swan model) that quotas raise quality while ad— Valorem tariffs leave
quality unaffected was shown to be unfounded. Moreover, their effects
were shown to depend on the valuation of quality increments by marginal as
compared to all consumers —i.e.to demand conditions rather than to cost
conditions as in the Swan model. Away tocompare "infinitesial" equivalent
powers was developed. The useofthis technique showed that when import
equivalent policies were compared in terms of their quality effects, tariffs
weredominated by quotas in the "normal"case and not justinthe Swan model.
Inthe other cases (considered to be somewhat special),itwas shown that
theserankings could be reversed.— 28—
Footnotes
1Advertising costs for example are often thought of as being fixed and
productspecific.
2The effects of trade restrictions and their comparisons are all
evaluated at the free trade levels throughout the paper. In addition,
in order to be able to simplify the analysis I assume throughout that
derivative of the Inverse demand function with respect to quality is a
monotonic function of output.
3 Spence (1976).
4 As an example one might consider the following. There is a con—
tinuuin of consumers, indexed by e ,withreservation price u(6,q).
All consumers purchase one unit of the commodity, or none. Consumers
are distributed by f(O). u8(8,q) > 0. Demand is then given by
l_F(O*(p,q)) ,where8* Indexes the marginal consumer. P(x,q)
represents the corresponding inverse demand function. !ssycalcula-
tions show that as expected, if high 0 consumers value increments In
quality more than low 8 ones, so that U9q > 0then xq < 0 as:
_u8q18*(P(x,q) ,q) ,q]
Pq(x) —f(8*(P(x,q),q))
5 See Rodriguez (1979) and Santoni and Van Cott (1980) for
details.
6 i assume q(0) —0for all— 29—
Forthis model, simple differentiation shows that:
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